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Abstract
In this paper, we make an exploratory use of computational techniques (genetic algorithms and
Monte Carlo simulations) to compute efficient and emergent networks in a patialized version of the
connections model of Jackson and Wolinski (1996). This approach allows us to observe and dis-
cuss inefficiencies that arise in a strategic network formation context with imperfectly link-mediated
positive externalities to connections and spatial link costs. Our results highlight that, depending
on the strength of the externalities, emergent and efficient networks may share several structural
properties. Nevertheless, emergent networks are insufficiently dense and should be more structured
around central agents.
Keywords: Strategic Network Formation; Efficiency; Genetic Algorithms; Monte Carlo Simula-
tions
JEL codes: D85, C63, D62, Z13
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1 Introduction
The analysis of network structures has been the object of a high and growing interest in various fields
during the last decade. Much effort has been dedicated to understand the topology of real networks.
More recently, some studies concentrate on the dynamic processes that determine such topologies. In
economics, recognizing that both individual and collective behaviors and performances are grounded
in networks, several authors focus on the micro-behaviors that drive network formation. In the ACE
literature, the emergent properties of networks have been studied by Kirman and Vriend (2001) and
Tesfatsion (1997) who model the formation of trade networks among strategically interacting buyers
and sellers. These agents choose their partners adaptively on the basis of their past experiences with
these partners1,2. The aim of such computational approaches is to study complex dynamic systems
of interacting agents.
A more theoretical and analytical economic literature on network formation builds upon the
seminal contributions of Aumann and Myerson (1988) and of Jackson and Wolinski (1996). Two
main questions are central in this literature (Jackson 2004): which network are likely to form when
agents choose their connections in order to maximize given individual payoffs structures, and how
efficient are networks that emerge from self-interested agents’ choices? The first stylized economic
model that tackles those two questions is the so-called Connections model introduced by Jackson
and Wolinski. In this model, costly direct connections between agents create positive externalities to
other agents, the strength of which decreases with relational distance. The very simple specification
of the individual payoffs allows the authors to obtain systematic analytical results on graphs efficiency
and partial results on networks stability. One of their main results is that efficient networks are often
unstable. More recently two articles have extended this model in order to study the dynamics of
network emergence (see Watts 2001 for deterministic dynamics and Jackson and Watts 2002 for
stochastic dynamics). In those contributions, the analytical computation of (possibly numerous)
emergent networks becomes difficult. More generally, this literature faces important difficulties in
generating and discussing non-trivial network configurations. Indeed, the specific network structures
that they analyze are very simple (complete network, empty network, complete star) and have little
in common with real social or economic networks. Some frequent features of real social networks are
short average distance between agents, high clustering (i.e. there is a high probability for two agents
to be neighbors if they have common neighbors), and heterogeneous neighborhood sizes among agents
(Watts and Strogatz 1998, Albert and Baraba´si 1999). These properties altogether characterize the
so-called Small World phenomenon3.
Very recently, Carayol and Roux (2004, 2006) and Jackson and Rogers (2005) proposed varia-
tions of the Connections model by giving different forms of geographic locations to individuals and
introducing complexities in individual payoff functions through spatial costs of direct link forma-
tion4. Their aim is to find some simple specifications that lead to endogenous networks that are
much richer and that tend to correspond to the empirically observed social networks. In their spa-
1For a survey on ACE models studying network formation, one can refer to Tesfatsion (2003).
2A similar approach is also used by Dupoe¨t and Yıldızog˘lu (2006) for studying the emergence of a particular type
of network: communities of practice.
3Empirical characterizations of small worlds have for example been provided for networks of firm board members
(Davis and Greve 1997) or for networks of scientific papers co-authorship (Baraba´si et al. 2001, Newman 2001).
4Johnson and Gilles (2000) first introduced such spatialized connections model with linear geographical distance.
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tialized connections model, Carayol and Roux (2004) obtain, in a dynamic setting and for a wide
set of parameters, endogenous networks, called emergent networks5, that exhibit the Small World
properties (i.e. highly clustered connection structures and short average path length). Nevertheless,
the interpretation of their results is limited since even for a relatively small set of agents, it becomes
very difficult to compute network efficiency both analytically and numerically6. Indeed, one cannot
appreciate the extent to which emergent networks are efficient and whether they are structurally
different from the optimal networks. Carayol et al. (2005) propose using Genetic Algorithm (GA)
techniques to compute efficient networks. They test and calibrate this technique on simple models,
among then the Connections model7 (for which the efficient networks are fully known) and show that
the proposed method is quite robust for computing the efficient networks in these models.
In the present paper, we make an exploratory use of this approach to compute the efficient
networks in the spatialized connections model. This allows us to compare, for the first time, the
(GA) efficient networks to the emergent networks in this model. Thus we can fully discuss various
failures that may arise in the network formation context. Our aim is to provide a general method for
exploring the efficient and equilibrium networks. The results of this exploration should be very useful
to any ACE model that contains a network formation component. The modeler can get some useful
insights on the possible results of his/her model and on the consequences of the different assumptions
on network formation. In the context of our model, we show that the emergent networks are less
dense than the ones that maximize social wealth. This clearly corresponds to the economic intuition:
because agents benefit from indirect connections, there are positive indirect externalities to bond
formation. Therefore agents naturally build fewer links than they should; they tend to free ride on
the connections of their neighbors. Moreover the emergent networks are found to be less centralized
than they should be. Indeed the supplementary connections observed in the efficient networks are
preferentially attributed to one or several agents who have central positions in the network. These
connections allow a more efficient distribution of wealth among all agents. Emergent networks do
not share such a structural property because agents do not want to play a central and costly role.
Agents would benefit from mutualizing the costs for increasing the connectivity of one (or several)
of them so as to enhance the quality of the indirect connections in the network. This underlines the
need for coordination in strategic network formation to allow for the emergence of central agents in
networks.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section begins with some basic definitions on
network formation literature and presents the model. Section 3 synthetically presents the Genetic
Algorithms approach for determining efficient networks. Section 4 compares the emergent and the
efficient networks. Section 5 concludes.
5This concept should not be confused with the concept of emergence used in the Complex Adaptive System literature,
as well as in the ACE approach.
6Even for a relatively small numbers of players, the number of possible networks becomes very large. Johnson and
Gilles observe that the number of possible networks for n agents is
Pc(n,2)
k=1 c(c(n, 2), k) + 1 where, for every k ≦ n,
c(n, k) := n!/ (k!(n− k)!) . For example, when n = 8, the number of possible networks exceeds 250 million.
7They also study the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky, which exhibits negative externalities, and the
line-spatialized Connections model of Johnson and Gilles.
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2 Network formation: the model
In this section, we begin with basic notions on non-directed graphs. We then introduce our model,
a simple spatialized variation of the Connections model where bonds are symmetric and built on
mutual consent, as occur in many real social networks. Finally, the concept of network efficiency is
presented before we turn to the dynamic perturbed process that leads to networks formation.
2.1 Basic notions on graphs
We consider a finite set of n agents, N = {1, 2, ..., n} with n ≥ 3. Let i and j be two members of
this set. Agents are represented by the nodes of a non-directed graph, the edges of which represent
the links between them. The graph represents the relational network between the agents. A link
between two distinct agents i and j ∈ N is denoted ij. A graph g is a list of non-ordered pairs of
connected and distinct agents. Formally, {ij} ∈ g means that ij exists in g. We define the complete
graph gN = {ij | i, j ∈ N} as the set of all subsets of N of size 2, where each player is connected
with all others. Let g ⊆ gN be an arbitrary collection of links on N . We define G =
{
g ⊆ gN
}
as
the finite set of all possible graphs between the n agents.
Let g′ = g+ ij = g∪{ij} and g′′ = g− ij = g\ {ij} be respectively the graph obtained by adding
ij and the one obtained by deleting ij from the existing graph g. The graphs g and g′ are said to
be adjacent, as are the graphs g and g′′. For any g, we define N(g) = {i | ∃j : ij ∈ g} as the set of
agents who have at least one link in the network g. We also define Ni(g) as the set of i’s neighbors,
that is, Ni(g) = {j | ij ∈ g} . The cardinal of that set ηi(g) = #Ni(g) is called the degree of node i.
The total number of links in the graph g is η(g) = #g.
A path in a non-empty graph g ∈ G connecting i to j, is a sequence of edges between distinct
agents such that {i1i2, i2i3, ..., ik−1ik} ⊂ g where i1 = i, ik = j. Let i ←→g j be the set of paths
connecting i and j on graph g. The set of shortest paths between i and j on g noted i←˜→gj is such
that ∀k ∈ i←˜→gj; then k ∈ i←→g j and #k = minh∈i←→gj #h. The geodesic distance between two
agents i and j, is the number of links of a shortest path between them: d(i, j) = dg(i, j) = #k, with
k ∈ i←˜→gj. When there is no path between i and j then their geodesic distance is conventionally
infinite: d(i, j) =∞.
Several typical graphs can be described. First of all, the empty graph, denoted g∅, is such that
it does not contain any links. The ring g◦ is a network in which all agents are connected and only
connected with their two closest geographic neighbors. The double (triple) ring denoted g2◦ (g3◦) is
a network such that all agents are only connected with their four (six) closest geographic neighbors.
Finally, a complete star, denoted g⋆, is such that #g⋆ = n− 1, and there exists an agent i ∈ N such
that if jk ∈ g⋆, then either j = i or k = i. Agent i is called the center of the star. It should be noted
that there are n possible stars since each node can be the center.
2.2 The spatialized “Connections Model”
In the Connections model introduced by Jackson and Wolinski, links represent individuals’ relation-
ships (for example, friendships). In such a context, agents benefit not only from their costly direct
connections, but also from indirect links through the relational network of their partners. However,
the communication is not perfect; the positive externality deteriorates with relational distance ac-
3
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cording to a decay parameter. As a consequence, agents try to maximize the value generated from
direct and indirect connections, avoiding superfluous connections.
In order to generate emergent networks that tend to correspond to empirically observed social
or economic networks, Carayol and Roux (2004, 2006) propose a variation of the Connections model
assigning a fixed geographic location to agents on a circle. Doing this, they introduce an exogenous
distance between agents that could be interpreted as physical, as well as social or cognitive, distance.
The spatial costs two agents bear for their direct connection linearly increase with the geographic
distance separating them on the circle8.
Formally, let us assume that agents are equidistantly located on a ring with unitary intervals9.
We then define a new distance operator denoted l(i, j). Without loss of generality, agents are ordered
according to their index, such that i is the immediate geographic neighbor of agent i+ 1 and agent
i−1. Agents 1 and agent n, also neighbors, close the ring. As a consequence, the geographic distance
between any two agents is given by l(i, j) = min {|i− j| ;n − |i− j|} .
Let pii (g) :
{
g | g ⊆ gN
}
→ ℜ be the net individual payoff that i receives from his position in the
network g. Formally it is given by the following expression:
pii (g) =
∑
j∈N\i
δd(i,j) − c
∑
j:ij∈g
l(i, j), (1)
where d(i, j) is the geodesic distance between i and j. δ ∈ ]0; 1[ is the decay parameter. Then δd(i,j)
gives the payoffs resulting from the (direct or indirect) connection between i and j. It is a decreasing
function of the geodesic distance since δ is less than unity. Notice that if there is no path between i
and j, then d(i, j) =∞ and thus δd(i,j) = 0. The second part of the right-hand side of the equation
describes the costs of direct links. c ∈ ]0; 1[ is a parameter that gives the costs that agents have to
bear for each of their direct connection.
2.3 Network efficiency
The network social value, denoted pi (·) , can be computed simply by summing individual payoffs.
The total value of a graph g, with pi(∅) = 0 is thus given by:
pi (g) =
∑
i∈Npii (g) . (2)
Since the pioneering work of Jackson and Wolinski, a ‘strong’ notion of efficiency is used in the
economic literature on networks formation: a network is said to be efficient if it maximizes this sum.
The formal definition follows.
8The assumption according to which link costs increase with distance can be justified by the fact that closely located
agents incur lower costs to establish communications (Debreu 1969) and, more generally, to coordinate. Indeed, when
agents are distant, face to face interactions imply higher transporting costs and time. This seems to still hold despite
the introduction of internet technologies since they are complementary to face to face interactions (Gaspar and Glaeser,
1998). Moreover, geographic distance can also generate higher monitoring costs (eg. Lerner 1995).
9We also could have considered a location on a line (as in Johnson and Gilles) or on separate islands or cities (like
in Jackson and Rogers). We also could have introduced irregularities about agents’ locations on the circle (attributing,
for example, random locations). Nevertheless, our specification allows us to avoid ex ante asymmetry between agents.
For instance, on a line, the two agents at the far ends are, by assumption, in the periphery while agents in the middle
of the line are offered a central position, or if agents are located on islands and if the intra-island connection cost is
lower than the inter-island ones, then local clustering is strongly expected.
4
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Definition 1 A network g ⊆ gN is said to be efficient if it maximizes the value function pi(g) on the
set of all possible graphs G (i.e. pi(g) ≥ pi(g′) for all g′ ⊆ gN ).
It should be noticed that several networks can lead to the same maximal total value. For example,
if we consider strictly homogeneous agents, any isomorphic graph of an efficient network is also
efficient.
2.4 Network formation
We turn now toward the stability of graphs. Jackson and Wolinski introduce the notion of pairwise
stability that departs from the Nash equilibrium since the process of network formation is both
cooperative and non-cooperative. In such a process, the formation of a link between two agents
requires the consent of both of them, but not its deletion, which can unilaterally emanate from one
of them. The formal definition of this notion is the following. A network g ⊆ gN is pairwise stable if
i) for all ij ∈ g, pii(g) ≥ pii(g − ij) and pij(g) ≥ pij(g − ij), and ii) for all ij /∈ g, if pii(g + ij) > pii(g),
then pij(g + ij) < pij(g).
In the present paper we are interested in the dynamic network formation presented in Jackson and
Watts. This approach is consistent and encompasses the stability notion presented above. It roughly
corresponds to the following scheme. At each period, two agents i, j ∈ N are randomly chosen with
the same and constant probability ptij = p > 0. They can decide to form, maintain or break links.
Let’s assume that agents are myopic: they take their decisions on the basis of the immediate impact
of links on their current payoffs. If these agents are already connected, they consider whether they
may unilaterally severe the link or bilaterally keep it. If they are not directly connected, they consider
whether they should add this connection or stay disconnected. Formally, the dynamic process can
be described as follows:
i) if ij ∈ gt, the link is saved if and only if pii(gt) ≥ pii(gt − ij) and pij(gt) ≥ pij(gt − ij),
ii) if ij /∈ gt, a link is created if and only if pii(gt + ij) ≥ pii(gt) and pij(gt + ij) ≥ pij(gt) with a
strict inequality for at least one of the two agents.
We introduce small but non vanishing random perturbations of agents’ decisions in creating,
maintaining or deleting links. These perturbations may be understood as mistakes or as random
experiments. We propose to let such an error term decrease in time according to the following simple
rule:
εt = 1/ (t+ 1) + ε. (3)
This rule ensures that a significant noise affects the dynamics in the beginning, but it decreases
monotonically with time down to a small strictly positive limit: limt→∞ εt = ε. Agents are likely to
make fewer and fewer errors through time while still a very small error probability persists in the
long run.
The evolution of the system at any time t depends only on the present state of the system
given by the graph structure gt. The stochastic process is thus Markovian. The evolution of the
system {gt, t > 0} can be described by the time-varying probability matrix (P(εt)) describing the
one-step transition probabilities at each period t between all possible states of the finite state space
G. According to Robles (1998), the long run equilibrium ψ (ε) of such time-inhomogeneous Markov
chain exists, is unique, and is equal to the equilibrium of the Markov chain perturbed by the constant
5
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error ε10. It is then ergodic. This property is interesting since it renders numerical experiments more
tractable in order to examine with good confidence the long run behavior of the system (Vega-
Redondo 2006). We label the networks on which the process stabilizes in the long run as emergent
networks. The definition follows.
Definition 2 A network g ∈ G is emergent if its probability of occurrence (ψg(ε)) in the long run
equilibrium of the stochastic process described by the transition matrix P(εt) is strictly positive. The
set of emergent networks is Ĝ = {g ∈ G |ψg(ε) > 0}.
Notice that the set of emergent networks is broader than the set of stochastically stable networks
(Young 1993) that is included in Ĝ 11.
3 Efficient networks: the Genetic Algorithms approach
Searching for efficient network structures is in general a difficult analytical task, but once the pay-off
structure is well-defined in relation with the connection structure, one is tempted to explore this
question using more heuristic strategies. As a matter of fact, the connection structure of the network
can be expressed as a matrix of bits (1 for connection or 0 for absence of connection), and the payoff
structure can assign a value to each of such matrices. The search for efficient networks can hence
be seen as an optimization problem in the connection-matrix space (i.e. the space of all possible
networks). This optimization problem yields analytical solutions only for simple payoff structures.
We examine here a numerical tool for optimization: genetic algorithms (GA) that have proved their
efficacy in optimization problems where the potential solutions can be represented as binary strings.
Our networks can effectively be quite easily represented as binary strings.
3.1 Representing networks as binary strings
Our problem is to find the network g tha maximizes social value pi as given by the equation 2 over
the set of all possible networks G. In order to use the GA for this optimization problem, we need to
represent our networks as binary strings (sequences of bits – 1 or 0).
Consider first that any network with n agents (whether directed or not, eventually with self-
connections) can, without loss of generality, be represented by a connection matrix of size n × n
of binary elements. Given that all networks we consider are undirected (i is connected to j iff j
is also connected to i) and that self-connections are excluded, the upper triangular part of this
connection matrix, excluding the diagonal, provides complete information on the network structure.
As a consequence, the vector composed by all the connection bits of this upper triangular part in
some conventionally chosen order sums up the network structure. Thus for a network of n agents,
this vector is a binary string of length L =
(
n2 − n
)
/2. Undirected networks can hence be formally
represented as chromosomes defined as sequences of binary elements: A = (a1, a2, ..., aL) with ai ∈
{0, 1} ,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}.
10See Proposition 3.1 of Robles (p. 211).
11If we label µ (ε) the (unique) stationary distribution of the time-homogeneous Markov chain associated with tran-
sition matrix P(ε), this claim is formally: for all g such that, if limε→0 µg(ε) > 0, then ψg(ε) > 0. This can be
easily proved by recalling the Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) theorem that states ∀g, ψg(ε) = µg(ε) is of the form
ψg(ε) = υg(ε)/
P
g′
υg′(ε) with υg(ε) a polynomial in ε.
6
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In the example below with n = 3 agents, the undirected network g = {13, 23} is fully characterized
by the chromosome A = (0, 1, 1) , whose length is L =
(
32 − 3
)
/2 = 3.
 1
3
2
→ g = {13, 23} →
1
2
3
1 2 3

0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0

→ A = (0, 1, 1)
Once we represent it, we can compute the value of a connection matrix (its fitness) using the
equation 2 and utilize the Genetic Algorithms to search for matrices with the highest value.
3.2 Genetic Algorithms: How do they work?
Genetic algorithms (GA) are numerical optimization techniques developed by John Holland (2001
initially published in 1975). GA transpose to other problems the strategies that the biological evolu-
tion has successfully used for exploring complex fitness landscapes. The search for an optimum by a
GA corresponds to the evolution of a population of candidate solutions through selection, crossover
(combination) and mutation (random experiments). The GA have been used for solving a very large
set of problems directly or indirectly as a component of a classifier system. Goldberg (1991) gives
quite an exhaustive account of the characteristics of the GA and of their applications12.
The canonical genetic algorithm causes a population of binary strings (chromosomes composed of
1 and 0) to evolve. The size of the population m is given. This population is the source of one of the
strengths of the GA: implicit parallelism (the exploration of the solution space using several candi-
dates in parallel). The population of chromosomes at step t (a generation) is denoted Q(t) = {Aj}t
with #Q(t) = m, and ∀t = 1, 2..., T with T the given total number of generations. Notice that T
is the other source of the strengths of the GA. The algorithm (randomly) generates an initial pop-
ulation Q (0) of candidate chromosomes that are evaluated at each period using the fitness (value)
function. They are used for composing a new population at the next period Q(t+1). For illustrative
purposes, Figure 1 gives a deliberately trivial example of optimization by GA. Each chromosome
has a probability of being selected that is increasing in its fitness. The members included in the
new population are recombined using a crossover mechanism. The crossover operation introduces
controlled innovations in the population since it combines the candidates already selected in order
to invent new candidates with a potentially better fitness. Moreover, the mutation operator ran-
domly modifies the candidates and introduces some random experimenting in order to explore more
extensively the state space and escape local optima. Typically, the probability of mutation is rather
low in comparison with the probability of crossover because, otherwise, the disruption introduced
by excessive mutations can destroy the hill-climbing capacity of the population. Finally, an elitism
operator can be used that ensures that the best individual of a population will be carried to the next
generation13.
12For applications of the GA as a learning algorithm, see Yıldızog˘lu (2002).
13See Dawid (1999) and Michalewicz (1996) for general properties of genetic algorithms.
7
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1)  00011  (=3)
2)  01100  (=12)
3)  10111  (=23)
1)  00011  (=3)
2)  01100  (=12)
3)  10111  (=23)
Population at date  t
Population at date  t Fitness: f(x)=x
2
Fitness: f(x)=x2
1)  9
2)  144
3)  529
Meanf=227
1)  9
2)  144
3)  529
Meanf=227
Expected number:
 f(x)/Meanf
Expected number:
 f(x)/Meanf
1)  0.0
2)  0.6
3)  2.4
 Sum=3
1)  0.0
2)  0.6
3)  2.4
 Sum=3
Effective number 
proportionally drawn
Effective number 
proportionally drawn
1)  0
2)  1
3)  2
  Sum=3
1)  0
2)  1
3)  2
  Sum=3
New population
New population
1')  10111  (=23)
2')  01111 (=15)
3')  10100 (=20)
1')  10111  (=23)
2')  01111 (=15)
3') 10100 (=20)
Crossover (3)-(2) at bit 3
Crossover (3)-(2) at bit 3
1')  11111  (=31*)
2')  01111  (=15)
3')  10100  (=20)
1')  11111  (=31*)
2')  01111  (=15)
3')  10100  (=20)
Mutation (1)
Mutation (1)
1')  11111  (=31)
2')  01111  (=15)
3')  10100  (=20)
1')  11111  (=31)
2')  01111  (=15)
3')  10100  (=20)
Population at date  t+1
Population at date  t+1
Simple application of GAs to optimize the function f(x)=x
2
over the interval 0-31.  Intergers are coded with five bits 
binary code: 00001=1, 11111=31.The example uses an initially random population of 3 members and the GA 
constructs a new population through selective reproduction, combination (crossover) and random experiments (mutation). 
In this schematic example, the GA attains the optimum (31) in one period. For each string, the crossover, its position and 
the partner, as well as mutation position are chosen randomly. The mutation bit simply switches its value: 0->1 or 1->0.
This process is controlled by: population size, bit-string size, probability of crossover and probability of mutation. 
Simple application of GAs to optimize the function f(x)=x2 over the interval 0-31.  Intergers are coded with five bits 
binary code: 00001=1, 11111=31.The example uses an initially random population of 3 members and the GA 
constructs a new population through selective reproduction, combination (crossover) and random experiments (mutation). 
In this schematic example, the GA attains the optimum (31) in one period. For each string, the crossover, its position and 
the partner, as well as mutation position are chosen randomly. The mutation bit simply switches its value: 0->1 or 1->0.
This process is controlled by: population size, bit-string size, probability of crossover and probability of mutation. 
1')  10111  (=23)
2)  01100 (=12)
3) 10111 (=23)
1')  10111  (=23)
2)  01100 (=12)
3) 10111 (=23)
Figure 1: A simple example of genetic algorithm
In our approach, each mutation corresponds either to the creation of a new undirected link in
the network or to the removal of an existing link. The impact of the crossover is more dramatic, it
combines subnets belonging to two different networks in order to connect them and to create two
new networks in the population (in replacement of their parents). The crossover after the first bit
position between the chromosome A1 = (0, 1, 1) representing the network g1 = {13, 23} (see the
example above) and the chromosome A2 = (1, 0, 0) corresponding to the network g2 = {12} would
give the chromosomes A3 = (1, 1, 1) and A4 = (0, 0, 0), respectively corresponding to the complete
network and the empty network.
4 Emergent and efficient networks: Measures and results
We present our research protocol in the next subsection. The second subsection exposes the first
results on efficient networks, and the last one compares the emergent networks to GA efficient net-
works.
4.1 Simulation protocol: Numerical settings, indicators and controls
4.1.1 Numerical settings
Our numerical experiments all correspond to n = 20 agents. For the generation of both the GA–
efficient networks and the emergent networks, all experiments are performed with randomly drawn
values of δ over the value space ]0, 1[.
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The first series of experiments relate to the computation of the GA–efficient networks. The Java
JGAP14 library is used to implement the GA based on binary chromosomes. The GA that we use
is elitist and its probabilities of crossover and mutation are both computed by JGAP15. Carayol et
al. test the relevance of the GA as a search algorithm for efficient networks in two stylized models
for which the efficient networks are known and establish the robustness of the GA using an extensive
set of Monte Carlo simulations. When n = 20, we know that the GA performs correctly with a
population of chromosomes of size m = 500 evolving over T = 500 generations. We will use these
numerical values in the present paper. In this article, we slightly adapt the simulation protocol in
order to increase the robustness of our results. For each configuration, we now fully run three times
the GA in order to obtain three final candidate networks among which we keep the one that generates
the highest social value as the GA–efficient network.
The second series of numerical experiments are designed to search the emergent networks defined
in Section 2. We use Monte Carlo experiments to generate networks that are on the support of ψ(ε).
The limit error term ε is set to 10−4. All experiments are stopped at T = 20, 000, the period after
which the process is proven to have almost surely stabilized on a given pairwise stable state (more
than 96% after 20,000 periods). Otherwise, we found that an error recently affected the system.
Thus, we dropped these experiments to ensure that the results are not contingent to recent arbitrary
changes16.
4.1.2 Indicators
Several indicators are used in order to provide a synthetic characterization of the structural properties
of networks.
Average Degree (or Average Number of Neighbors). We compute the average degree of the network
as follows:
ηˆ(g) = 2η(g)/n. (4)
Average Distance (or Average Path Length). We compute the average distance of (directly or indi-
rectly) connected agents. It is given by
d (g) =
∑
i
∑
j 6=i d (i, j) × 1 {i↔g j 6= ∅}
# {i, j |i 6= j; i, j ∈ N ; i↔g j 6= ∅}
, (5)
if η (g) > 0, with # {·} denoting the cardinal of the set defined in brackets and 1 {·} , the indicator
function that is equal to unity if the condition in brackets is verified and zero otherwise.
Average Clustering (or Average Cliquishness, as it is often referred to in the physics of networks
literature). The average clustering indicates the extent to which the neighborhoods of connected
14http://jgap.sourceforge.net/.
15Probability of crossover is set by JGAP such that in every generation half of the population is concerned by it
on average (so the default crossover rate is 1/2). The probability of mutation is calculated by JGAP based on the
size of the chromosomes in the population such that, on average, one gene will be mutated for every ten chromosomes
processed by this operator. Our partial experiments with these parameters have not showed any significant bias caused
by these default choices.
16Notice that emergent networks could also be part of a closed cycle in the associated time-homogeneous unperturbed
process (Jackson and Watts). We found no such cycle in the numerical experiments.
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agents overlap. It is given by
c (g) =
1
n
∑
i∈N ;ηi(g)>1
# {jl ∈ g |j 6= l; j, l ∈ Ni(g)}
# {j, l |l 6= j; j, l ∈ Ni(g)}
. (6)
It is the frequency with which agents’ neighbors are also neighbors together.
Next, we compute the distribution of neighborhood size in the population.
Global Asymmetry. It is computed using the difference between the largest neighborhood size and the
lowest one in the network:
r(g) = max
i∈N
ηi(g)−min
j∈N
ηj(g). (7)
This indicator measures the global asymmetry of neighborhood sizes in the network.
Last we are also interested in the extent of neighborhood asymmetry between directly connected
agents.
Local Asymmetry. It is computed as the sum over all direct connections of the absolute value of the
difference between neighborhood sizes. That is,
u(g) =
1
η(g)
∑
ij∈g
|ηi(g) − ηj(g)| , (8)
if η (g) > 0. This indicator gives the propensity of the highly connected agents to be linked to agents
that have few connections. It can be understood as a measure of non-assortativity of connections as
regards agents’ neighborhood sizes.
4.1.3 Controls for density
The last four indicators presented above (all but the average degree) are affected by the density
of the network that is likely to vary with δ, c and the generating process (of efficient or emergent
networks). For instance, it is easy to see that the mean degree of network affects crucially the
average distance of the networks: more dense networks are likely to exhibit a shorter average path
length. Without any control for density, one cannot know whether a network is shorter thanks to
the structural allocation of links or simply thanks to a higher density. This is also true for the three
other indicators. Therefore, a rigorous structural analysis of emergent and efficient networks should
control for such a bias. Thus, we propose to build, for each generated network, control random graphs
that have exactly the same number of agents and connections (thus the same density).
Such random networks are simply built by allocating a given number of edges to randomly chosen
pairs of agents (Erdo¨s and Re´nyi 1960). For each given number of edges of emergent networks, the
average distance, the average clustering, the global and local asymmetry indicators are numerically
computed and averaged over 1, 000 of such random graphs. For instance, instead of looking at d (g),
where g is an emergent network, we compute the ratio d (g) /d
(
grd
)
, where d
(
grd
)
denotes the mean
average distance of the 1, 000 random networks that have exactly the same average degree as g. Thus,
the four indicators are corrected using the corresponding ratio.
This benchmarking procedure was introduced by Watts and Strogatz to identify complex graph
structures. In particular, relying on such ratios, they highlighted that “small worlds” are character-
ized by the two following properties: c (g) /c
(
grd
)
≫ 1 and d (g) /d
(
grd
)
≈ 1. Small world networks
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are highly clustered as compared to random graphs, and simultaneously their average distance is
close to the one of random graphs that are known to exhibit very short average path length.
Now we are able to appreciate fully how GA efficient and emergent networks of a given number of
links structurally differ from random networks, that is, how those links are allocated over all possible
pairs of agents (the possible links). This method allows us (i) to analyze the structural properties
of networks given their density, and (ii) to compare efficient and emergent networks for the different
values of δ while controlling for their density. We will underline in the next section the relevance of
this normalization when we will discuss the results concerning main indicators.
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Figure 2: The average degree of GA–efficient networks for random draws of δ and for the various
values of c: 0.05 (circles), 0.1 (crosses), 0.15 (squares), 0.2 (triangles), 0, 3 (diamonds).
4.2 The structural properties of GA–efficient networks
To analyze the structural properties of GA efficient networks, we run 1, 000 experiments with ran-
domly drawn values of δ ∈ ]0, 1[ and for five values of the cost parameter c ∈ {0.05; 0.1; 0.15; 0.2; 0.3}17.
In Figure 2, one can observe that the average degree of GA efficient networks exhibits an inverse
U-shape with δ for all values of c. When δ is small the average degree is null. As δ increases, it
reaches an intermediary plateau where agents have in average two connections. The average degree of
the network then increases up to a maximum plateau for 0.3 . δ . 0.4, the height of which decreases
with c. When δ & 0.7, the average degree decreases down to a value slightly below or equal to two
when δ tends to the unity. Except when δ is close to its extrema, average degree always decreases
with c.
These results meet the economic intuition. When c increases and δ decreases, the net social
returns to links formation decrease below zero. The empty network is then the efficient network18.
17Notice that when c > 0.3, the set of efficient networks becomes narrow (empty or ring networks). One can observe
in Figure 2 that most of networks obtained for c = 0.3 are already either weakly connected or empty.
18One can refer to Carayol and Roux (2006) for an analytical proof indicating that the empty network is the only
efficient network when δ is close to zero (when δ + (n−2)
4
δ2 < c). Thus, as observed in Figure 2, the value of δ under
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When the decay tends to unity, direct and indirect connections are likely to provide the same social
surplus, and thus multiple paths between the same agents become redundant. In this case, the
average degree of efficient networks tends to the average degree of a network connecting all agents
with a minimal number of links.
Proposition 1 The average degree of GA efficient networks exhibits an inverse U-shape along δ for
the different values of c. It is null when δ is close to 0, and it tends to 2 when δ is close to 1. In
between, average degree decreases with c.
The results for the ratios (the other indexes corrected for density) are summarized in Table 1 in the
Appendix19. The region for which δ < 0.1 is never taken into considerations because, since efficient
networks are empty, most indicators are not computable. We find that the average distance of the
GA–efficient networks is globally (δ ≥ 0.1) no more than 7% longer than random graphs’ distance
(see the ratio d(g)/d(grd) in Table 1). Moreover, for δ ∈ [0.4, 0.7[ or δ ∈ [0.7, 1[, average distances
are even always shorter in comparison with the controls. This result is noticeable since the average
distance between any two indirectly connected agents is already known to be very “short” in random
graphs. At the same time, the average clustering ratio of the efficient networks is always significantly
greater than 1, and when both c ≥ 0.15 and δ ∈ [0.1, 0.4[ or δ ∈ [0.4, 0.7[, the efficient networks
are even more than twice clustered than their controls. The conjunction of the two characteristics
c (g) /c
(
grd
)
≫ 1 and d (g) /d
(
grd
)
≈ 1 qualifies the efficient networks as Small Worlds in the sense
of Watts and Strogatz.
Proposition 2 For a large intermediary region of values of δ (δ > 0.4 and excluding cases in which
δ is close to 1) and for different values of c, efficient networks have an average distance (path length)
similar to the one of the control random networks while they are significantly more clustered than
these random networks. In this sense they correspond to Small Worlds a` la Watts and Strogatz.
As regard the two other ratios, an interesting contrast arises when one compares, for each value of c
and δ, the global and local asymmetry ratios. Efficient networks are always more locally asymmetric
than they are globally asymmetric as compared to their random controls: see that r(g)/r(grd) <
u(g)/u(grd) for all values of c and δ in Table 1. For instance, for c = 0.1, they are 99% as globally
asymmetric as their controls, while they are 60% more locally asymmetric. In this case, though the
global asymmetry is quite similar (slightly lower) to the one of a network for which connections would
have been simply allocated at random, agents with fewer links have a significantly higher chance to
be directly connected to agents who have many connections. This underlines the social benefit of
providing some central positions to a few agents and to have them directly connect to more peripheral
agents. This would reduce the distance between all agents and thus increase the social surplus.
We also find that both local and global asymmetry ratios are the highest when δ ∈ [0.7, 1[ .
The social need for both central and local coordination is the highest when the decay is high: the
social returns of central structuration(s) tends to overcome its high costs (since it implies distant
connections that are costly)20.
which the empty network is the only efficient network increases with c.
19Appendix is available on the JEBO website.
20The superiority of such networks in terms of social surplus is likely to decrease sharply when δ comes very close to 1
because the connections of various lengths tend to provide the same wealth (the decay phenomenon becomes negligible).
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Proposition 3 Efficient networks always exhibit more local asymmetry than global asymmetry as
compared to their random controls (r(g)/r(grd) < u(g)/u(grd)): efficient networks are more likely to
directly connect their central agents to peripheral ones than random networks. The need for centralized
coordination is the highest when δ ∈ [0.7, 1[ .
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Figure 3: Comparison (gross difference and ratio) of mean social values of GA-efficient networks and
emergent networks over 30 identical length intervals of δ ∈]0, 1[.
4.3 Inefficiencies in emergent networks
We now compare emergent and efficient networks. For the clarity of the argument, we will present
experiments performed on only one value for the parameter c: c = 2/n = 0.1. This value corre-
sponds to the assumption that the most costly link is equal to unity (in the ring metric, we have
maxi,j∈N l(i, j) = cn/2 = 1), which is also the upper bound of a positive externality one can get from
another (single) agent (since δ ∈ ]0, 1[). Moreover, this intermediary value is preferred among the five
values studied above because it allows us to explore the richest set of configurations21. Notice that
the general propositions presented below are robust to the other values of c. Our results are drawn
over 500 GA efficient networks and 1, 500 emergent networks, again with random values of δ ∈ ]0, 1[.
The first results arise from the comparison of the social value generated by GA-efficient networks
and the social value of emergent networks. As Figure 3–(b) shows, the ratio of the average social
values of both types of networks (average emergent networks divided by average GA, for the same
intervals of δ) is always lower than the unity. Moreover, we observe that this ratio increases globally
with δ. Figure 3–(a) shows that this convergence to 1 does not exclude an increase in absolute differ-
ences since for both GA–efficient and emergent networks, increasing δ always significantly increases
the social value.
Proposition 4 The social value of emergent networks is always lower than GA-efficient networks
computed on similar values of δ.
The second series of results relate to networks average degree. Apart from the regions where δ
is either close to 0 or close to 1, the average degree of emergent networks is lower than the one of
efficient networks (see Figure 4). Agents generate fewer connections than they should, as regards
21Proofs can be obtained from the authors under request.
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Figure 4: The average degree of GA–efficient networks (black discs) and of emergent networks (gray
triangles) for the various values of δ when c = 0.1.
social surplus. This clearly confirms the economic intuition that arises from the basic payoff function
of the Connections model: there are positive externalities to link formation since a given agent’s
neighbors, and those to whom he is indirectly connected, benefit from any new connections he would
establish. Therefore, it is not surprising that selfish agents, who do not take into account the social
returns of link formation, establish too few connections.
Proposition 5 When δ is neither close to 0 nor close to 1, the average degree of emergent networks
is lower than the average degree of efficient networks: agents generate fewer connections than they
should as regard social surplus.
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Figure 5: The average distance (a) and the (controlled for density) average distance ratio (b) of GA
efficient networks (black discs) and of emergent networks (gray triangles) for the various values of δ
and with c = 0.1.
We now explore further structural differences that exist between GA–efficient and emergent net-
works. Before pursuing this topic, we establish to what extent these structural differences between
GA and emergent networks are really due to differences in bond allocation (instead of to their density
differences)22. To that aim, both Figure 5 and Figure 6 present respectively uncontrolled and con-
trolled indicators for average distance and average clustering. Leaving aside scaling considerations,
22A theoretical discussion of this issue is the purpose of subsection 4.1.3.
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controlling for density does not produce significant changes in the differences in average distance be-
tween GA and emergent networks. This means that most of the differences observed in Figure 5–(a)
are, in fact, not much due to underlying density differences but to different allocations of connec-
tions among agents (observed Figure 5–(b)). As regards average clustering, Figure 6-(a) exhibits a
systematically superior clustering of GA–efficient networks, while Figure 6-(b) shows that controlled
values exhibit fewer differences in average clustering between efficient and emergent networks. More,
emergent networks have a higher average clustering ratio when 0.2 . δ . 0.25 and 0.3 . δ . 0.4.
Differences between GA–efficient and emergent networks due to bond allocation might even be op-
posite to the differences due to the joint effects of bond allocation and networks density. These two
situations (either insignificant differences for average distance or significant differences for average
clustering) illustrate why we prefer (and thus from now on exclusively discuss) the controlled indica-
tors that infer potential structural differences in bond allocation between GA–efficient and emergent
networks23.
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Figure 6: The average clustering (a) and the (controlled for density) average clustering ratio (b) of
GA efficient networks (black discs) and of emergent networks (gray triangles) for the various values
of δ and with c = 0.1.
The relational distances between agents in the network (see Figure 5–(a)) are key factors for
wealth generation since they directly intervene in the payoff function. We find that the average
distance of emergent networks, even controlling by random networks, is always longer than the one
of efficient networks (except for δ ≤ 0.15, in which case the average distances are equal, and for
one single GA experiment corresponding to a δ very close to 1). When 0.15 . δ < 0.45 or δ > 0.7
(see Figure 5–(b) and Table 2) the controlled average distance of emergent networks is significantly
greater. In these regions of δ, agents do not generate costly shortcuts. One can see in Figure 7
that when δ = 0.3, the illustrative emergent network is a ring whereas the GA efficient has some
distant connections: the individual rewards of forming such connections are too low as regards their
costs. When δ = 0.9 or 0.95, the difference between private gross returns from (relational) shorter
and longer connections becomes too low as compared to the difference in their costs. It is only for
intermediary regions of δ that agents are provided with nearly sufficient incentives to bear the costs
23Due to space constraints, we do not present uncontrolled local and global asymmetry indexes. These do not
significantly differ from the controlled values, leading us to concentrate on those (controlled) indicators for which the
reader knows that the differences are not due to density differences between GA-efficient and emergent networks.
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δ = 0.2 δ = 0.3 δ = 0.4 δ = 0.6 δ = 0.8 δ = 0.9 δ = 0.95
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Figure 7: Illustrative networks for different values of δ
associated with long distance connections. In particular, for δ ∈ [0.5, 0.7[, the emergent networks
have an average distance equal to their control random graphs while efficient networks have a slightly
shorter average distance (3% less) than their own controls24.
Proposition 6 The average distance is globally longer for emergent networks than for efficient net-
works (even controlling for average degree), but for an intermediary region (δ ∈ [0.5, 0.7[), the average
distance of emergent and efficient networks become very close to the average distance of their control
random graphs.
What are the implications in terms of clustering of the payoff function assumed by the spatialized
connection model? Except for extreme values of δ, there is no simple answer to this question.
On the one hand, the Connections model provides positive externalities that are conveyed through
the network: agents benefit from other agents with whom they are indirectly connected. Such
externalities are the highest at distance 2. Thus agents have low incentives to form triangles (which
would increase clustering), thus connecting to those agents from whom they already benefit. This
is particularly true when δ becomes very close to δ2 (for δ slightly larger than 0.1 or close to 1)
holding constant the costs of link formation. On the other hand, when forming triangles, agents
reduce the distances between their respective neighbors who then better benefit from each other.
Efficient networks are thus expected to be more clustered than emergent ones since the social returns
to overlapping connections (i.e., forming triangles) are higher than the associated private returns:
agents do not consider the positive externalities that forming such triangles would generate on other
players.
We find that the average clustering of emergent networks is null when 0.1 < δ < 0.2, while the
same arises for efficient networks for 0.09 < δ < 0.15 (see Figure 6–(b)). Thus, when 0.1 < δ < 0.15,
the average clustering of both emergent and efficient networks is null. In both cases, we systematically
find the ring network in which agents are connected only to their two nearest geographic neighbors.
When δ then slightly increases, clustering of both efficient and emergent networks jumps up to
nearly five times their control random networks. This corresponds to locally clustered networks, as
Figure 7 illustrates in the case of δ = 0.2. As δ increases again, the average clustering of efficient and
emergent networks decreases first sharply then more slowly, down to a plateau reached at δ = 0.4
24Notice that the clustering ratio of emergent networks fails to remain high when c is large (c = 0.3) because such
very costly links tend to prevent the creation of distant connections that would decrease the average distance to a
similar extent as in random networks.
16
Page 19 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
0
1
2
3
4
gl
ob
al
 a
sy
m
m
et
ry
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
delta
0
5
10
15
lo
ca
l a
sy
m
m
et
ry
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
delta
(a) (b)
Figure 8: The global asymmetry ratio (a) and the local asymmetry ratio (b) of GA efficient networks
(black discs) and of emergent networks (gray triangles), and their median-band fitted values, for the
various values of δ and with c = 0.1.
in the case of efficient networks and at δ = 0.5 for emergent networks. The average clustering of
efficient networks decreases more sharply because they generate shortcuts while emergent networks
remain locally clustered. In both cases, the plateau ends when δ ≈ 0.7. We find (see Table 2) that
for δ ∈ [0.5, 0.7[, efficient networks are 54% more clustered than their control random networks,
while the emergent networks are 32% more clustered than their own controls25. Figure 6–(b) shows
that networks again become less clustered than their controls
(
c(g)/c(grd) < 1
)
, but only when both
0.7 < δ . 0.85 and δ & 0.9 for emergent networks, and when δ & 0.9 for efficient networks. As
illustrated in Figure 7, these networks tend to be locally minimally connected with few triangles.
As regards emergent networks, this can be explained as follows: when δ comes close to unity, the
private returns to overlapping connections tend to zero. The average clustering of efficient networks
is maintained when 0.7 < δ < 0.9, thanks to the simultaneous presence of simple ring connections
and of some very connected agents (and thus of triangles) (see Figure 7 for δ = 0.8).
Proposition 7 For a large intermediary region (δ ∈ [0.2, 0.7]), efficient and emergent networks are
both significantly more clustered than their control random networks. Globally, while controlling for
their average degree, efficient networks are more clustered than emergent networks (except in a narrow
region 0.3 . δ . 0.4 for which the reverse holds).
We now consider the distribution of connections over agents in the efficient and the emergent
networks (see Figure 8). The global asymmetry ratio of neighborhood sizes of efficient networks is
0.99, while the global asymmetry ratio of emergent networks is only 0.37 (Figure 8–(a) and Table 2).
Therefore, efficient networks have a much more uneven distribution of connections than emergent
networks. Comparing the local asymmetry ratios of efficient networks (1.6) and emergent networks
(0.43) also leads to the idea that the emergent networks have a much too balanced distribution of
connections over agents (see Figure 8–(b)). This statement applies to all regions of δ (see Figure 7 and
Table 2 in the Appendix) except when δ is very close to unity. The simultaneity of both geographically
embedded connections and some more central agents in the network also explains why clustering is
25Notice again that emergent networks fail to sustain a high clustering when c is large (0.2, 0.3) because when links
are so costly, only minimally locally connected networks are formed and thus few triangles.
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so high in efficient networks. When δ ≈ 0.9, very centralized networks become efficient and the
asymmetry ratios of efficient networks become very high: Figure 7 illustrates that efficient networks
tend to provide some agents with many connections (“stars”) while the emergent networks fail to
do so (this can be observed for δ equal to 0.8, 0.9 and 0.95). The absence of some highly connected
agents in emergent networks stresses another source of inefficiency in network formation: the emergent
networks are much less structured around central agents who would contribute to increase the wealth
in the population.
Proposition 8 Emergent networks have a too much balanced distribution of connections over agents.
Decentralized strategic interactions in network formation do not favor the emergence of central agents
who would improve social wealth.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we make a simultaneous use of two new approaches for computing emergent (Monte
Carlo experiments) and efficient networks (Genetic Algorithms) in a spatialized variation of the
Connections model. In this model, agents balance the benefits of forming or maintaining links
against their costs, which increase with geographic distance. Direct connections between agents
create positive externalities to other agents, the strength of which decreases with relational distance.
We then compare the structural properties of emergent and efficient networks. For this purpose, we
rely upon several indexes and ratios (which correct for networks density).
Our results highlight inefficiency sources in social networks formation. First, we find that emer-
gent networks are significantly less dense than efficient ones: agents generate fewer connections than
they should as regards social surplus because the model exhibits positive externalities to bond for-
mation. Selfish agents do not naturally build those links for which the social returns overbalance the
establishment costs while the private returns do not. Our second result is that agents are in average
(socially) too distant from each other: emergent networks lack some costly distant connections. It
is only when the decay parameter (that tunes the externalities) takes intermediary values that this
difference is reduced since the private returns of distant connections are then the highest. Third,
efficient networks are globally more clustered than emergent networks: the social returns to triangu-
lar connections are again higher than their private returns. Last, emergent networks do not exhibit
enough asymmetries between agents (the distribution of links among agents is too balanced). This
should be contrasted with the efficient networks where connections are preferentially attributed to
a few agents who thus gain central positions in the network. Emergent networks do not share this
structural property because no agent wants to bear the costs associated with such a central position,
even if increasing the connectivity of some (ex ante identical) agents enhances the quality of many
indirect social connections.
These results indicate that agents would socially benefit from the compensation of some of them
for internalizing networks externalities. This would increase the local density of the network and
ensure the establishment of more costly (geographically) long distance connections that are partic-
ularly important in reducing relational distance between agents. Agents would also be better off if
some agents (or only one of them, depending on the decay parameter) were selected and subsidized
to play central roles.
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Two types of mechanisms may be mobilized to try to overcome such inefficiencies. Global policies
could aim at selecting and subsidizing some agents to be at the center of stars. They could also aim at
subsidizing links and even make this depend on the spatial length of the connection26. Nevertheless,
in some circumstances, the regulator may be legally constrained and may not have the right to
provide advantages to selected agents. More importantly, in the formation of many networks, the
regulator would face information asymmetries: it is not clear whether he may effectively observe the
network or even agents’ attributes. When regulation is not appropriate, agents may rely only on
decentralized bargaining mechanisms. Direct side payments may intervene between agents in the
formation of links. Agents may also subsidize the formation of connections between other agents.
Nevertheless, even then the decentralized bargaining does not guarantee that efficient networks will
form: it is necessary that the transfers can be made contingent on the networks that will form so as
to overcome the huge combinatorial problems agents face (Bloch and Jackson 2007). More, it is not
because efficient networks are pairwise stable given the transfers that such a network will emerge in
the long run. Such questions constitute an avenue for further research.
6 Appendix
Ratios c \ δ 0.1− 0.4 0.4− 0.7 0.7− 1 0.1− 1
c = 0.05 1.01 (0.03) 0.99 (0.00) 0.95 (0.08) 0.98 (0.06)
d(g) c = 0.1 1.18 (0.30) 0.97 (0.01) 0.92 (0.13) 1.02 (0.22)
d(grd) c = 0.15 1.28 (0.37) 0.94 (0.02) 0.88 (0.13) 1.02 (0.27)
c = 0.2 1.45 (0.37) 0.95 (0.06) 0.88 (0.12) 1.07 (0.32)
c = 0.3 1.49 (0.39) 0.91 (0.05) 0.95 (0.33) 1.06 (0.37)
c = 0.05 1.47 (0.29) 1.31 (0.00) 1.51 (0.43) 1.43 (0.32)
c(g) c = 0.1 2.40 (1.38) 1.56 (0.19) 1.62 (0.73) 1.87 (0.99)
c(grd) c = 0.15 2.69 (1.70) 2.09 (0.18) 1.66 (0.87) 2.12 (1.10)
c = 0.2 2.72 (2.27) 2.97 (0.36) 1.30 (1.20) 2.34 (1.58)
c = 0.3 2.03 (1.98) 2.88 (0.52) 1.32 (1.09) 2.00 (1.39)
c = 0.05 0.29 (0.22) 0.12 (0.00) 0.94 (0.77) 0.48 (0.61)
r(g) c = 0.1 0.71 (0.20) 0.76 (0.20) 1.45 (0.63) 0.99 (0.53)
r(grd) c = 0.15 0.62 (0.42) 1.35 (0.25) 1.90 (0.60) 1.32 (0.66)
c = 0.2 0.33 (0.33) 1.59 (0.48) 1.87 (0.63) 1.32 (0.81)
c = 0.3 0.32 (0.35) 1.42 (0.24) 1.62 (0.42) 1.25 (0.63)
c = 0.05 0.42 (0.24) 0.22 (0.02) 1.65 (2.38) 0.82 (1.60)
u(g) c = 0.1 1.16 (0.32) 1.01 (0.36) 2.55 (1.88) 1.60 (1.34)
u(grd) c = 0.15 0.98 (0.65) 1.90 (0.30) 3.40 (1.58) 2.13 (1.37)
c = 0.2 0.59 (0.52) 2.22 (0.64) 3.68 (1.42) 2.24 (1.54)
c = 0.3 0.49 (0.50) 2.35 (0.55) 3.01 (0.91) 2.20 (1.22)
Table 1: Average values (standard deviations in parentheses) of the various indicators computed on GA–
efficient networks relative to their control random networks drawn for various regions of δ and for different
values of c. The region for which δ < 0.1 is never taken into consideration because both efficient and emergent
networks are empty and thus most indexes are not computable.
26Network considerations may be appropriate for funding collaboratory research projects. For instance, the European
Commission that explicitly aims at fostering European research space may also consider such network variables.
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Ratios g \ δ 0.1− 0.3 0.3− 0.5 0.5− 0.7 0.7− 0.9 0.9− 1 0.1− 1
d(g) GA efficient 1.25 (0.34) 0.99 (0.02) 0.97 (0.01) 0.92 (0.04) 0.90 (0.23) 1.02 (0.22)
d(grd) Emergent 1.59 (0.31) 1.09 (0.07) 1.00 (0.01) 0.99 (0.02) 1.18 (0.21) 1.17 (0.29)
c(g) GA efficient 2.64 (1.60) 1.75 (0.21) 1.54 (0.18) 1.78 (0.48) 1.24 (1.06) 1.87 (0.99)
c(grd) Emergent 1.71 (1.98) 1.86 (0.31) 1.32 (0.11) 1.12 (0.44) 0.12 (0.21) 1.36 (1.11)
r(g) GA efficient 0.67 (0.16) 0.78 (0.23) 0.76 (0.19) 1.26 (0.50) 1.94 (0.68) 0.99 (0.53)
r(grd) Emergent 0.13 (0.18) 0.35 (0.09) 0.40 (0.06) 0.51 (0.12) 0.56 (0.14) 0.37 (0.19)
u(g) GA efficient 1.19 (0.32) 1.09 (0.35) 0.99 (0.35) 1.97 (1.41) 4.05 (2.11) 1.60 (1.34)
u(grd) Emergent 0.24 (0.33) 0.48 (0.11) 0.39 (0.10) 0.51 (0.13) 0.68 (0.21) 0.43 (0.23)
Table 2: Average values (standard deviations in parentheses) of the various indicators computed on GA–
efficient networks and emergent networks relative to their control random networks drawn for c = 0.1 and for
various regions of δ.
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